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1. INTRODUCTION
To suggest that .

.

. any physician .

.

. had a duty to obtain

informed consent for a non-recommended treatment modality is
nonsensical and creates an unnecessary and untenable basis of
liability against a physician. . . . Such a requirement would force

physicians to describe and discuss treatment options that they
have no intention of administering even if, after discussion, the
patient would select it.'
The doctrine of informed consent is enshrined in medical-legal
jurisprudence. "Unquestionably, . . . [it] is one of the hallmarks of the
physician-patient relationship." 2 Since the phrase "informed consent"
first appeared in a reported American judicial opinion, it has been the
frequent subject of legal scholarship, including journals, texts, and
casebooks, 4 as well as medical literature. The medical negligence
1. Cline v. Kresa-Reahl, 728 S.E.2d 87,93 (W. Va. 2012).
2. Marc D. Ginsberg, Inforned Consent: No LongerJust What the Doctor Ordered?
The "Contributions" of Medical Associations and Courts to a More Patient Friendly
Doctrine, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 17, 18 (2010).
3. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1957) ("In discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be
employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent.");
For examples of scholarship attributing the initial use of "informed consent" in case law
to Salgo, see Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L.
REV. 137, 138 (1977); Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 69, 72 (1994).
4. See generally JANET L. DOLGIN & Lois L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 46
(3d ed. 2013); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-9 (2d ed. 2000); MARK A.
HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 195-96 (8th ed. 2013); Ginsberg, supra note

2; Katz, Law's Vision, supra note 3; Katz, Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, supra note 3;
Marcus L. Plante, Some Legal Problems in Medical Treatment and Research, An
Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968); Leonard L. Riskin,
Informed Consent: Lookingfor the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L. REV. 580; David E. Seidelson,
Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full-Disclosure" Jurisdictions, 14
DUQ. L. REV. 309 (1976); Daniel P. Sulmasy, Informed Consent Without Autonomy, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 207 (2002); Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informned
Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628 (1970).
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lawsuit is a recognized "occupational hazard," 6 and consent based
medical negligence claims are not uncommon.'
The purpose of this Article is not simply to re-examine the doctrine
of informed consent. The purpose is to identify how the doctrine has
evolved, how its scope has expanded, and how it has created serious
consequences for physicians and patients. Specifically, this Article
focuses on the differential diagnosis 8 -the process by which a physician
arrives at a diagnosis-and how some jurisdictions have manipulated
informed consent to encompass this process. This Article will urge that
the application of informed consent to the differential diagnosis is an
unnecessary expansion of the doctrine and potentially compromises
health care.
11. A BRIEF HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

The history of the informed consent doctrine has been extensively
covered in the medico-legal literature and case law;' therefore, it is a
subject not requiring extensive re-examination here. However, some
background is required for contextual purposes-as a foundation for the
position that expansion of the doctrine can be detrimental to health care.

5. See generally CARL HORN ET AL., LAW FOR PHYSICIANS 95 (2000); William A.
Silverman, The Myth of Informed Consent: In Daily Practiceand in Clinical Trials, I5 J.
MED. ETHICS 6 (1989); Shlomo Cohen, Nudging and Informed Consent, 13 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 3 (2013); Graeme Laurie, Recognizing the Right Not to Know: Conceptual,
Professional, and Legal Implications, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 53 (2014).
6. Louis J. Regan, Malpractice, an OccupationalHazard, 156 JAMA 1317, 1317
(1954).
7. See PHYSICIAN LAw-EVOLVING TRENDS & HOT ToPics 2013, at 97 (Wes
Cleveland ed., 2014); Richard G. Roberts, Seven Reasons Family Doctors Get Sued and
How to Reduce Your Risk, 10 FAM. PRAC. MGMT. 29, 32 (2003).
8. See Robert S. Ledley & Lee B. Lusted, Reasoning Foundations of Medical
Diagnosis, 130 SCIENCE 9, 9 (1959) ("[T]o make a differential diagnosis, I list all the
diseases which the specific case can reasonably resemble. Then I exclude one disease
after another from the list until it becomes apparent that the case can be fitted into a
definite disease category, or that it may be one of several possible diseases, or else that its
exact nature cannot be determined.). Courts have also used and defined the term
"differential diagnosis." See Westbeny v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th
Cir. 1999) ("Differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, is a standard scientific
technique of identifying the cause of a medical problem by eliminating the likely causes
until the most probable one is isolated."); Nelson v. Matrixx Initiatives, No. C 09-02904
WHA, 2012 WL 3627399, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012); Hendrix v. Evenflo Co., 609
F.3d 1183, 1189 (1Ith Cir. 2010); McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1252
(1 1th Cir. 2005).
9. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 380-83 (Cal. 1993).
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There is respectable evidence to suggest that informed consent may
have its origins in ancient times.10 Insofar as American law is concerned,
the following pronouncement by Judge Cardozo, in Schloendorff v.
Society ofNew York Hospital," that "[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages," 2 has
been extolled by courts' 3 and is central to the concept of patient
autonomy. Schloendorfif, however, did not speak to the scope of informed
consent, or more specifically, to the scope of the physician's required
disclosure necessary to obtain the patient's consent.' Another equally
celebrated opinion, Canterbury v. Spence, did.' 5 This is the point of
departure for this Article.
III. A PROCEDURE (OR TREATMENT) BASED DOCTRINE
The doctrine of informed consent should be a focused procedure or
treatment based doctrine, not a "full disclosure" doctrine. The distinction
should not be blurred or confused. A recent example of this confusion
and its eventual, fortunate consequences will be discussed later in this
Article.' 6
I have previously written about (and still subscribe to) the
fundamental principles of informed consent,' 7 as follows: "The doctrine
of informed consent requires physicians to disclose to patients (without
having been asked by the patient) the risks and benefits of, and
alternatives to, proposed treatment.. The doctrine may be based in
common law or in statute.""8

10. P. Dalla-Vorgia et al., Is Consent in Medicine a Concept Only ofModern Times?,
27 J. MED. ETHICS 59, 59 (2001).
11. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
12. Id.
13. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Thor, 855 P.2d at
378.
14. Schloendorff 105 N.E. at 93.
15. Canterbury,464 F.2d at 782-83.
16. See Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627
(Wis.. 2012); see also Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (2008), repealed and replaced by Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 448.30 (West 2013).
17. Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 19-20.
18. Id. (citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783; Ficke v. Evangelical Health Sys., 674
N.E.2d 888, 889 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Blotner v. Doreika, 678 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Ga. 2009)
(noting that the state of Georgia does not recognize the common law doctrine of informed
consent)).
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Consequently, the doctrine of informed consent presumes that the
physician has engaged in the process of and obtained a differential
diagnosis for the patient.' 9 This process involves "making a diagnostic
choice between alternatives, disproving the unlikely and trying to prove
one (or more) to be correct." 20 This process further involves the
physician "asking two questions: Does the diagnosis explain all the
findings?, and, Are the expected findings present?" 2 1
This process is intended to result in a diagnosis and treatment
recommendation. It is the treatment recommendation, realistic, available,
alternative treatments for the diagnosed condition, and risks and
complications of treatment (or no treatment) that must be disclosed by
the physician in order to obtain the patient's informed consent to
treatment.
These parameters (or limitations) of the doctrine of informed consent
cannot be overemphasized. Canterbur2 2 speaks to the scope of the
doctrine:
The context in which the duty of risk-disclosure arises is
invariably the occasion for.decision as to whether a particular
treatment procedure is to be undertaken.

It is a duty to warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed
treatment .

. .

. We now find, as a part of the physician's overall

obligation to the patient, a similar duty of reasonable disclosure
of the choices with respect to proposed therapy and the dangers
inherently and potentially involved.

In broad outline, we agree that '[a] risk is thus material when a
reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know
to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance
to the risk . . . in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed

therapy.'

19. See, e.g., Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003)
(discussing various descriptions of the differential diagnosis).
20. Robert B. Price & Z. Reno Vlahcevic, Logical Principles in Diferential
Diagnosis,75 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 89, 90 (1971).

21. Id. at 90-91.
22. Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772.
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The topics importantly demanding a communication of
information are the inherent and potential hazards of the
proposed treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any, and
the results likely if the patient remains untreated.23
Canterbury does not solely describe the purpose of the doctrine. It
demands the understanding that the doctrine is not simply one of "full
disclosure," i.e., that the physician is not obligated to disclose to the
patient the entire thought process of the differential diagnosis, diagnoses
disregarded, and treatment not recommended as the end product of the
differential diagnostic process.24
Were this not so, consider the predicament for the physician,
especially when caring for patients with common complaints. A patient
sees a primary care physician in the office and complains of low back
pain. The differential diagnosis of low back pain includes numerous
(approximately three dozen) diseases grouped under the headings of
mechanical low back pain, non-mechanical spine disease, and visceral
disease.25 Or, assume our hypothetical patient complains of chronic daily
headaches. A similarly extensive differential diagnosis applies. 26 This
differential diagnosis has been characterized as "challenging."2 7 Or,
assume our hypothetical patient is a child complaining of acute
abdominal pain. Medical literature has reported on eight categories (each
with multiple diseases) of causes of acute abdominal pain in children. 2 8
Next, consider the process of the differential diagnosis in connection
with length of office visit. There is a substantial body of medical
scholarship concerning the length of the office visit and quality of care.29
23. Id. at 781, 782 & 787-88.
24. The differential diagnostic process will consider and reject potential diseases. The
failure "to investigate an otherwise unindicated disease is not malpractice." Curry v. Dr.
Elena Vezza Physician, P.C., 963 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
25. Steven J. Atlas & Richard A. Deyo, Evaluating and Managing Acute Low Back
Pain in the Primary Care Setting, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 120, 121 (2001).
26. Marcelo E. Bigal & Richard B. Lipton, The Differential Diagnosis of Chronic
Daily Headaches: An Algorithm-Based Approach, 8 J.HEADACHE PAIN 263, 264 (2007).
27. Id.
28. Alexander K.C. Leung & David L. Sigalet, Acute Abdominal Pain in Children, 67
AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 2321, 2322 (2003); see also William G. Sheridan et al., NonSpecific Abdominal Pain: The Resource Inplications, 74 ANNALS ROYAL COLL.
SURGEONS ENG. 181, 182 (1992) (noting numerous miscellaneous diagnoses for patients
with abdominal pain).
29. See generally Clarence H. Braddock & Lois Snyder, The Doctor Will See You
Shortly--The Ethical Significance of Time for the Patient-Physician Relationship, 20 J.
GEN. INTERN. MED. 1057 (2005); Lena M. Chen et al., Primary Care Visit Duration and
Quality-Does Good Care Take Longer?, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1866 (2009);
Ming Tai-Seale et al., Time Allocation in Primary Care Office Visits, 42 HEALTH SERV.
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There is evidence to suggest that "factors such as complexity of illness or
a growing emphasis on patient participation in clinical decision making"
increase the duration of office visits. 30 If the doctrine of informed
consent is transformed to a full disclosure doctrine, encompassing the
differential diagnosis, treatments available for each possible diagnosis,
and discarded diagnoses, a physician would be unable to see more than a
few patients each day, and each patient would be overwhelmed with
information, much of which would be unhelpful. A full disclosure
doctrine is also potentially harmful to a patient's health and involves
unnecessary cost. These issues will be discussed later in this Article.3 '
The problems associated with an overly expansive doctrine of
informed consent are not theoretical. I now turn to those jurisdictions that
have confused full disclosure with the doctrine of informed consent. The
examination of relevant case law and statutes must begin in Wisconsin.
Wisconsin's experience with the law of informed consent provides the
classic example of how the judiciary does not understand medicine well
and how a cure to the problem required a professional and legislative
response.
IV. THE WISCONSIN EXPERIENCE
The history of the doctrine of informed consent in Wisconsin
developed as a product of the common law and legislation. A detailed
examination of six opinions of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,3 2 one
opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 33 legislative history 34
and two statutes3 5 reveals a most interesting story.36
RES. 1871 (2007); Kimberly S. H. Yamall et al., Primary Care: Is There Enough Time
for Prevention?,93 AM. J.PUB. HEALTH 635 (2003).
30. Chen et al., supra note 29, at 1869.
31. On a related topic, for an excellent discussion of the cost, in the largest sense, of
unnecessary annual physical examinations, see Michael B. Rothberg, The $50,000
Physical,311 JAMA 2175, 2175 (2014).
32. Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fam. Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627 (Wis.
2012); Bubb v. Brusky, 768 N.W.2d 903 (Wis. 2009); Hannemann v. Bayson, 698
N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 2005); Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995); Scaria v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207
N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1973).
33. McGeshick v. Choucair, 9 F.3d 1229 (7th Cir. 1993).
34. See ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, A.B. 941 (Wis. 1981).

35. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.30 (West 2013); Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (1981).
36. My former student, Michael Rohde, told a part of the Wisconsin story in Michael
Rohde, Information Overload: How The Wisconsin Supreme Court Expanded the
Doctrineof Informed Consent, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1097 (2013); see also Krista J.
Sterken et al., Mandatory Informed Consent Disclosures in the Diagnostic Context:
Sometimes Less Is More, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2014).
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A. Trogun v. Fruchtman3 7
The Wisconsin journey began in 1973, rather unremarkably, when
the supreme court issued its opinion in Trogun. Trogun involved a
physician's diagnosis of a patient as "possibly a diabetic" 38 and the
prescription of a diabetic diet, a diabetes medication, and another
medication for "primary TB, inactive." 39 Thereafter, the patient suffered
jaundice and hepatitis. 4 0 He claimed that his physician, an internal
medicine specialist, "failed to adequately advise [him] of the potential
side effects of the drugs he was prescribing and rendered [him] unable to
make an informed consent to such treatment." 41 The trial court granted a
non-suit.42
On appeal, the supreme court grappled with the doctrine of informed
consent in Wisconsin, discussing the theories of liability (battery and
negligence) that have historically related to the doctrine.43 In opting for
the negligence theory, the supreme court clearly explained that the
doctrine is treatment focused." The supreme court pronounced:
Several reasons exist for the inadequacy of the assault and
battery theory . . . where the alleged misconduct on the part of

the physician amounts to a failure to disclose the ramifications of
a pending course of treatment, therapy or surgery ....
We conclude that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish a physician's failure to disclose particular risk
information in connection with contemplated treatment . . . .
Experts are unnecessary to establish the materiality of the risk to
a patient's decision to undergo treatment or to the "reasonably,
expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision."A5

37. 207 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1973).
38. Id. at 299.
39. Id. at 299. See generally Stefan Grzybowski, Tuberculosis:A Look at the World
Situation, 84 CHEST 756 (1983); Woa Kyung Moon et al., Mediastinal Tuberculous
Lyinphadenitis: CT FindingsofActive and Inactive Disease, 170 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY
715 (1998); P. Van Dyck et al., Imaging ofPulmonary Tuberculosis, 13 EUR. RADIOLOGY
1771 (2003).
40. Trogun, 207 N.W.2d at 300.
41. Id. at 299.
42. Id. at 300.
43. Id. at 309-10.
44. Id. at 312, 315.
45. Id. (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 792, n.41).
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Indeed, the supreme court referred to Dean Prosser's explanation of the
doctrine of informed consent, which he explained as "the duty of the
physician or surgeon to inform the patient of the risk which may be
,,46
involved in treatment or surgery.
In Trogun, therefore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the
classic treatment or procedure based doctrine of informed consent,
consistent with Canterbury, as a part of Wisconsin's common law. All
would not be well for long, however, as the journey would become more
complicated and troublesome.
B. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 4 7
Scaria deserves significant attention. Not only is it one of the cases
which would shape the law of informed consent in Wisconsin; it was,
presumably, the impetus for Wisconsin's first informed consent statute.4 8
The arrival of the statute six years after Scaria,49 and its relationship with
Scaria'sholdings, must be analyzed closely in an effort to understand the
supreme court's Jandre50 opinion in 2012.
Mr. Scaria had suffered a hay fever attack and saw an allergist, who
prescribed medication at that time.5 At a subsequent appointment, the
allergist took Mr. Scaria's blood pressure and diagnosed severe
hypertension 5 2 and referred him to an internal medicine/cardiology
specialist.53
Mr. Scaria was hospitalized for further testing, including an
aortogram, a procedure which "will demonstrate renal parenchymal
diseases which may result in hypertension."54 He was advised how the
procedure would be performed, including "how the catheter would be
introduced into the femoral artery through an incision in the groin,
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
2012).
51.

Id. at 312 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 165 (4th ed. 1971)).
227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975).
Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (1981).
227 N.W.2d 647.
Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fan. Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627 (Wis.

Hay fever is defined as "seasonal allergic rhinitis. " Allergic Rhinitis, AMER.
OF ALLERGY ASTHMA & IMMUNOLOGY, http://www.aaaai.org/conditions-andtreatments/conditions-a-to-z-search/Allergic-Rhinitis.aspx (last visited May 5, 2014);
Bonnie Sibbald & Elizabeth Rink, Labelling of Rhinitis and Hayfever by Doctors, 46
THORAX 378, 378-79 (1991).
52. See Joseph Varon & Paul E. Marik, The Diagnosis and Management of
Hypertensive Crises, 118 CHEST 214, 214 (2000).
53. Scaria, 227 N.W.2d at 649.
54. Arch W. Templeton, Renal Aortography, 95 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 383, 383
(1965).
ACAD.
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how ... dye would be injected, and how the X rays [sic] would be
taken."ss The procedure commenced, after which Mr. Scaria
"experienced a severe pain and involuntary jerking of his legs," 56 "back
pain and a funny feeling in his legs,",5 7 leg numbness, 58 leg paralysis59
and, ultimately, permanent paralysis "from the waist down."6 o
Not surprisingly, the lawsuit that was the subject of Scariaalleged "a
lack of informed consent and negligent post-operative care." 61 The
supreme court opinion makes clear that the plaintiff and defendant had a
serious disagreement as to the risks of the aortogram, which had been
disclosed to the patient in order to obtain the patient's informed
consent.6 2 Depending on the testimony, plaintiff was either advised or
not advised that:
[O]ne in a thousand cases there will be a possibility of some
complications, but that's not important . . . . [T]here was a

possibility of a clot forming in the site of the injection ....

[T]he risk of the procedure was less than that of an
appendectomy and that the most common problem would be
pain in the groin, that he could have a problem bleeding,
primarily into the skin near the puncture site, possibly
developing into a hematoma or blood clot, that possibly a clot
could develop in the vessel at the puncture site or an embolism
could go peripherally into his leg . . .. [H]e could experience an
allergic reaction to the dye . ...

The defendant physician "testified that he was aware of other risks about
which he did not inform Scaria, including the possibility of plaque
traveling into a vein in the leg, a punctured artery, a pseudoaneurysm, a
punctured aorta, an asthma-like condition, and adverse reactions to the

55. Scaria, 227 N.W.2d at 650.
56. Id. at 651.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Post-aortography leg paralysis has been described in the medical literature. See
Duncan A. Killen & John H. Foster, Spinal Cord Injury as a Complication of
Aortography, 152 ANNALS SURGERY 211, 211 (1960).
61. Scaria, 227 N.W.2d at 651.
62. Id. at 650.
63. Id. at 650.
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dye."6 The physician was aware that "[t]he consequences of these
occurrences could possibly be death, paralysis or loss of limb."s6 A
reading of the supreme court's opinion suggests that Scaria was not
advised that paralysis could ensue from a potential complication. Scaria
testified that if he had been informed of the risks and complications, he
would not have consented to the aortogram.
At trial, the jury returned verdicts for the defendants.67 On appeal,
informed consent was central to the supreme court's review.68
With respect to the supreme court's analysis of informed consent and
disclosure requirements, it is of paramount importance to understand that
Scaria focused on a specific medical procedure (aortogram) and the preprocedure disclosure to the patient necessary to obtain the patient's
informed consent. It is only with this understanding that a thorough
review of Scaria, Wisconsin's first informed consent statute,69 and
Jandre,70 is possible.
The supreme court generally previewed the physician's informed
consent disclosure requirement as the "doctor's duty to disclose and the
patient's right to be informed of the risks of the proposed treatment or
surgery." 7 This statement suggests a focus on the specific treatment
recommended to the patient. The court continued this theme by
commenting that "[t]he right to be recognized and protected is the right
of the patient to consent or not consent to a proposed medical treatment
or procedure." 72 The disclosure would include not only the proposed
treatment but "inherent and potential risks" 73 attendant thereto, "the
probabilities of success, and any alternative treatment or procedures if
such are reasonably appropriate so that the patient has the information
reasonably necessary to form the basis of an intelligent and informed
consent to the proposed treatment or procedure." 74 The key here is that
the doctrine of informed consent relates to "the treatment or procedure
proposed."75 This is the focus of the doctrine as contemplated by

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
2012).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 650-51.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 651-52.
Id. at 652.
Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (1981).
Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fain. Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627 (Wis.
Scaria, 227 N.W.2d at 652.
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 654.
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Canterbury v. Spence.76 A diagnosis is reached, treatment or a procedure
is recommended, and conserit is obtained.
C. The Original Wisconsin "Informed Consent" Statute78
Six years following Scaria, in 1981, Wisconsin adopted a statute
entitled "Information on Alternate Modes of Treatment." 9 This statute
provided as follows:
Any physician who treats a patient shall inform the patient about
the availability of all alternate, viable medical modes of
treatment and about the benefits and risks of these treatments.
The physician's duty to inform the patient under this section
does not require disclosure of:
(1) Information beyond what a reasonably well-qualified
physician in a similar medical classification would
know.
(2) Detailed technical information that in all probability
a patient would not understand.
(3) Risks apparent or known to the patient.
(4) Extremely remote possibilities that might falsely or
detrimentally alarm the patient.
(5) Information in emergencies where failure to provide
treatment would be more harmful to the patient than
treatment.
(6) Information in cases where the patient is incapable of
consenting.o
This is not a classic informed consent statute; it is much broader in focus.
In fact, it is a "physician disclosure" statute. It is not limited to a
specifically recommended treatment or procedure, as is contemplated by
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. at 272-74.
Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (1981).
Id.
Id.
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the doctrine of informed consent. It requires that the physician disclose
"the availability of all alternate, viable medical modes of treatment and
about the benefits and risks of these treatments." 82 The problem with the
scope of the new statute is that it might require the physician's disclosure
of the entire differential diagnosis, including discarded diagnoses, and all
"viable medical modes of treatment," whether or not recommended by
the physician. Essentially, although perhaps not predicted, this statute
could substantially and dangerously enlarge the doctrine of informed
consent to a doctrine never contemplated and one which is entirely
unworkable and potentially dangerous.
It is not clear to this author how this statute became the law of
Wisconsin. There is very little legislative history available, but that
which is available can be obtained from the Wisconsin Legislative
Reference Bureau.84
On January 2, 1982, a Fiscal Estimate was prepared regarding the
"Regulation of Medical Practice" and the proposed statute.8 5 In relevant
part, this Fiscal Estimate provides:
This proposal requires physicians to inform patients of available
options and treatment methods including information of risks
and benefits of treatment procedures. Presumably, this
professional practice requirement will increase complaints
against physicians licensed by the Medical Examining Board
.... It is estimated that this proposal would increase the current
complaint caseload by approximately 25%.16
These comments suggest that the new legislation will increase
complaints against physicians, presumably because of the breadth of the
statute. The Fiscal Estimate also indicates the need to add another
"Regulation Compliance Investigator" 7 in order "to process additional
complaints generated by the bill."88

8 1. See id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The Legislative Reference Bureau home page states "[t]he LRB provides
nonpartisan, professional, and confidential bill drafting, legal publishing, research and
library services to the legislature and the public." See STATE OF WiscONSIN LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE BUREAU, http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/ (last visited June 27, 2014).
85. FISCAL ESTIMATE, A.B. 941 (Wis. 1982).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Of greater importance is the bill's Analysis by the Legislative
Reference Bureau. This analysis provides in relevant part that "[t]his bill
places in the statutes the standard of care that physicians are required to
meet under Scaria. The bill requires physicians who treat patients to
inform their patients about the availability of all alternate, viable medical
modes of treatment and about the benefits and risks of these
treatments." 89 This analysis misconstrues Scaria and suggests that it was
a pronouncement of a full disclosure statute rather than an informed
consent statute. There is nothing contained in the legislative history
materials obtained from the Legislative Reference Bureau indicating why
the proposed legislation was so broad. The proposed legislation may
have been a product of a political agenda unknown to this author.
Whatever the motivation for the statute, it would become an enemy of
Wisconsin physicians.
D. Martin v. Richards (Court ofAppeals)90
The facts in Martin are not complicated. A young patient suffered
intracranial bleeding after a head injury following a bicycle accident. 9 '
Unfortunately, an emergency medicine physician diagnosed her with a
concussion.9 2 Later in the hospital, the patient worsened. She became
"somewhat irritable, uncooperative and uncommunicative." 93 Thereafter,
she became unresponsive and was transported to a university medical
center where CT scans revealed bleeding in her head, requiring surgery.94
As a result, the patient became "a spastic quadriparetic, with serious
speech and physical handicaps, although with normal or near normal
intelligence."95
The initial emergency medicine physician, having diagnosed a
concussion, did not inform the patient's parents "that a CAT scan would
disclose whether [the patient] was suffering intracranial bleeding or that
the hospital did not have a neurosurgeon on staff or on call."9 The

89. ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, A.B. 941, supra note 34.

90. 500 N.W.2d 691 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
91. Id. at 693.
92. Id. at 695. A concussion is "an immediate and transient loss of consciousness
accompanied by a brief period of amnesia after a blow to the head." Allan H. Ropper &
Kenneth C. Gorson, Concussion, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 166, 166 (2007).
93. Martin, 500 N.W.2d at 695.

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Wisconsin Court of Appeals considered whether this non-disclosure
implicated the Wisconsin "informed consent" statute.
The defendant physician reasonably asserted that the statute should
not apply insofar as he diagnosed a concussion, and therefore, "he had no
duty .

.

. to inform [the patient's] parents of modes of treatment for" an

intracranial bleed.9 The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the
defendant read the statute "too narrowly,"" stating that the statute "is
concerned entirely with information and knowledge."'" Curiously, the
court also noted that defendant's position "creat[ed] a strong disincentive
for full disclosure to the patient"10 1 and "is contrary to the intention of
the legislature." 10 2 Again, the doctrine of informed consent was never
intended as a full disclosure doctrine. As to the legislative intent of
statute 448.30, the mystery continues.
The dissent cogently noted that Martin was not an informed consent
case.10 3 The dissent also correctly noted that Scaria provided a narrower,
classic approach to the law of informed consent. 104
Following Martin, an anomalous situation confronted Wisconsin
physicians. A medical negligence defendant could be found not liable for
"negligence" but liable for failing to provide a full disclosure pursuant to
the Wisconsin informed consent statute.
E. McGeshick v. Choucair

05

Shortly after the Martin opinion, the Seventh Circuit Court of
06
Appeals decided McGeshick v. Choucair.1
Here, the court considered a
claim against a physician who examined and treated the patient at a clinic
to which the patient was referred. 07 The patient suffered low back pain,
possibly caused by spinal cord disease. 108 At the initial examination, the
defendant physician "could not rule out any of the possible causes of
[plaintiffs] myelopathy."109 Thereafter, a CT myelogramllo was

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 696-97
Id. at 697.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
9 F.3d 1229 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id.
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performed in order to screen for types of myelopathy."' This study was
interpreted with certain findings, but the interpretation did not suggest a
spinal arteriovenous malformation (AVM)." 2 A spinal MRI" 3 was
recommended, however, due to the CT myelogram findings.l 14
The spinal MRI was performed at a different institution.'" 5 The
interpretation was. inconclusive, but referred to the necessity of
angiography "[i]f there [were] clinical signs or symptoms of dural or
intraspinal AV fistula or malformation . . . .1 This interpretation was
sent to the defendant physician who had ordered the myelogram." 7 He
did not recommend the spinal angiogram." 8
Ultimately, the defendant physician continued to see the plaintiff,
who began to develop spinal vascular symptoms." 9 A follow-up MRI
was ordered, but before it could be performed (due to an inoperable
machine), the plaintiff suffered lower body paralysis.1 20 The plaintiff
underwent surgery which "revealed that a spinal AVM was the cause of
[plaintiff's] myelopathy."' 2 1 The AVM caused plaintiffs permanent

paralysis.12 2
110. See generally AM. COLL. OF RADIOLOGY, ACR-ASNR-SPR PRACTICE GUIDELINE
FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF MYELOGRAPHY AND CISTERNOGAPHY (2014), available at

(explaining
http://www.acr.org/~/media/f4c49aal834d46a081f5f0ff20eIe26b.pdf
myelography).
Il l. McGeshick, 9 F.3d at 1231.
112. Id. For discussions of spinal AVM's, see generally Bruce Rosenblum et al.,
Spinal Arteriovenous Malformations: A Comparison of DuralArteriovenous Fistulasand
IntraduralA VM's in 81 Patients,67 J. NEUROSURGERY 795 (1987); Robert F. Spetzler et
al., Modified Classification of Spinal Cord Vascular Lesions, 96 J.NEUROSURGERY 145
(2002).
113. See generally AM. COLL. OF RADIOLOGY, ACR-ASNR-SCBT-MR PRACTICE
PARAMETER FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (MRI) OF THE

at
available
(2014),
SPINE
ADULT
http://www.asnr.org/sites/default/files/guidelines/MRIAdultSpine.pdf.
114. McGeshick, 9 F.3d at 1231.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. For a discussion of the history of spine imaging, including spinal angiography,
see generally E.G. Hoeffner et al., Neuroradiology Back to the Future: Spine Imaging, 33
AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 999 (2012); see also Timo Krings et al., Spinal Vascular
Malformations, 15 EUR. RADIOLOGY 267, 268 (2005) (noting that "[s]elective spinal
angiography is the next diagnostic step once neurological symptoms and MRI speak in
favor of a SVM [spinal vascular malformations] to define the type of vascular
malformation and, thereby, to decide the appropriate therapy.").
119. McGeshick, 9 F.3d at 1231.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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At trial, "the court ... refused to give an instruction that [defendant]
had a duty to inform [plaintiff] about the possible causes of his
myelopathy and the possibility of angiography as a diagnostic measure to
exclude one of these causes." 2 3 It should be recalled that the defendant
did not order spinal angiography.12 4
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the "Wisconsin law on the extent of
the duty to inform,"l25 specifically referring to Trogun, 126 Scaria,127 and
the 1981 statute, 12 8 described by the Seventh Circuit as "an informed
consent law that codified the common law as it existed at the time in
Wisconsin." 29 The Seventh Circuit concluded that "[t]he plain language
of both the cases and the statute limit the doctrine of informed consent to
apprising the patient of the risks that inhere in a proposed treatment . . .
or in a procedure . . . ."130 In doing so, the court agreed with the Martin
dissent (previously discussed in this Article) and pronounced that
Wisconsin's statute "does not impose on the physician a general duty to
inform the patient; it limits the duty to inform to situations in which the
physician has proposed a recommended course of treatment."' The
Seventh Circuit predicted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would not
"adopt the reasoning of the [Martin] appellate court,"l32 and held that the
trial court properly refused to give an informed consent instruction in the
case at bar. 3 3
F. Martin v. Richards (Supreme Court)'34
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not follow the Seventh Circuit's
lead. In recounting the facts, the supreme court noted its understanding
that the emergency medicine physician diagnosed a concussion and not
an intracranial bleed.'3 5 The supreme court referred to the statute 36 and
stated: "This language appears clear in its directive. The difficulty in
applying the statute, however, is in determining how far the duty to
123.
124.
125.
.126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1232.
Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1973).
Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975).
Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (1981).
McGeshick, 9 F.3d at 1233.
Id.
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id. at 1235.
531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995).
Id. at 74.
Wis. STAT. §448.30 (1981).
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disclose extends, i.e., what is considered an alternate, viable mode of
treatment."' 37 Of course, the supreme court, by asking this question,
really begged the crucial one-does the statute require disclosure of nondiagnosed conditions and treatment options for those conditions?
The Wisconsin Supreme Court referred to the Analysis by the
Legislative Reference Bureau-previously discussed in this article-and
incorrectly, in my estimation, found that "[t]he language of the statute
parrots that of the language in Scaria, requiring physicians to disclose
alternate, viable forms of treatment and the risks and benefits of those
treatments."' 38 The holding in Scaria, as earlier discussed, was actually
narrower, focusing on the medical treatment or procedure proposed by
the physician, not on the universe of potentially applicable diagnoses and
treatments. 3 9
In the end, in Martin, the supreme court characterized the statute as a
"right to know" 4 0 law, requirinf the broad disclosure of information not
driven by the actual diagnosis.14 The Martin opinion, therefore, provided
the foundation for the subsequent, regrettable jurisprudence of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.
G. Hannemann v. Boysonl 4 2
In Hannemann, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held "that the scope of
a chiropractor's duty to obtain informed consent is the same as that of a
medical doctor."143 In doing so, however, the supreme court referred to
its holdings in Scarial44 and Martin'4 5 as if they were consistent. For
example, the supreme court, pursuant to Martin, couched the concept of
informed consent as relating to "the procedure proposed"' 4 6 or to
"request an alternative treatment or method of diagnosis." 47 Of course,
this is not the classic doctrine of informed consent; it represents a
doctrine of full disclosure. In the next sentence, in referring to Scaria, the
137. Martin, 531 N.W.2d at 76.
138. Id. at 78.
139. This is precisely the point of the defendant physician's position, as recognized by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Id. at 80 ("Dr. Richards argues the statute should not
impose a duty upon doctors to inform patients of alternate treatments for a condition not
diagnosed or not being treated by the physician.").
140. Id. at 81.
141. Id.
142. 698 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 2005).
143. Id. at 718.
144. Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975).
145. Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. 1995).
- 146. Hannenann,698 N.W.2d at 728 (quoting Martin, 531 N.W.2d at 79).

147. Id.
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supreme court defined informed consent as "a duty to 'make such
disclosures as appear reasonably necessary under circumstances then
existing to enable a reasonable person under the same or similar
circumstances confronting the patient at the time of disclosure to
intelligently exercise his right to consent or to refuse the treatment or
procedure proposed."' 1 4 8 This statement represents the classic form of the
doctrine.
Therefore, the Hannemann opinion only served to confuse
Wisconsin's common law of informed consent with its post-statutory
jurisprudence. This problem would only worsen. 149
H. Bubb v. Brusky' 5 0
In Bubb, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the dismissal of
an informed consent claim that was affirmed on appeal. 51 The supreme
court adhered to its broad interpretation of statute 448.30, holding that it
"requires any physician who treats a patient to inform the patient about
the availability of all alternate, viable medical modes of treatment,
including diagnosis, as well as the benefit and risks of such
treatments."' 5 2 This holding is simply not representative of the classical
law of informed consent.
Bubb is another example of a failure to diagnose having been
misinterpreted by the supreme court, with the assistance of the statute, as
an informed consent claim. Here, an emergency medicine (ER) physician
attended to a patient who had fallen from his chair while eating dinner.' 53
An ambulance took him to the hospital.15 4 The ER physician ordered
various tests and the patient began to improve. 55 The ER physician

148. Id. (quoting Scaria, 227 N.W.2d at 654).
149. It should be noted here that the Wisconsin Supreme Court continued its broad
interpretation of section 448.30 of the Wisconsin statute in Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545
N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996). The opinion emphasized that Wisconsin's doctrine of informed
consent is not limited to the disclosure of "only significant complications intrinsic to the
contemplated procedure." Id. at 504. The court continued in its position that the statute
pertains to disclosure of information. Insofar as Johnson focused on a novel issue, the
disclosure of physician experience (or inexperience) as a possible risk to the patient, and
continued with the previously discussed, strange and confusing approach to informed
consent, it is not a case featured in this paper. Johnson, however, was discussed by this
author in, Ginsberg, supra note 2, at 39-40.
150. 768 N.W.2d 903 (Wis. 2009).
151. Bubb v. Brusky, 756 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008), rev'd, 768 N.W.2d 903.
152. Bubb, 768 N.W.2d at 925.
153. Id. at 905.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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diagnosed a transient ischemic attack (TIA)'56 and contacted a neurology
consultant, who agreed to see the patient.' 57 The defendant ER physician
prescribed aspirin, advised the patient to see the neurologist the next
morning, and discharged the patient.158
The appointment with the neurologist was scheduled but never
occurred.159 The patient "suffered a large-scale stroke, affecting the right
side of his brain."' 60 He was left with permanent disabilities.
Suit was filed on behalf of the patient against the ER physician and
the neurologist.' 6 ' The complaint contained a claim against the ER
physician alleging that he "was liable for failing to properly inform [the
patient] of 'additional diagnostic tests or alternate treatment plans' in lieu
of discharge from the hospital." 62
The defendant ER physician cogently urged that this was not an
informed consent case.' 63 His position was "choosing between two
recognized methods [of treatment or diagnosis] doesn't necessarily mean
that the physician must instruct the patient on the other recognized
method."'" Essentially, this argument asserts that the doctrine of
informed consent does not require the disclosure of the differential
diagnosis and does not require the disclosure of treatments for discarded
differential diagnoses. If the physician fails to arrive at the correct
diagnosis, this implicates classic medical negligence but not the failure to
obtain informed consent.
The supreme court reviewed the history of its informed consent
jurisprudence and reviewed the statute,16 5 as it had done in prior
opinions. Again, the supreme court dismissed any incongruity between
Wisconsin's pre-statute common law and the post-statute jurisprudence
by stating: "Consequently, the standards set forth in Trogun and Scaria
are implicated in the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 448.30.",166 Again, the
156. Id. "A transient ischemic attack (TIA) has been defined classically as 'rapidly
developed clinical signs of focal or global disturbance of cerebral function lasting fewer
than 24 hours, with no apparent non-vascular cause."' S. Claiborne Johnston et al.,
National Stroke Association Guidelines for the Management of Transient Ischemic
Attacks, 60 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 301, 301 (2006). See generally Michael Daffertshofer et
al., TransientIschemic Attacks Are More than "Ministrokes," 35 STROKE 2453 (2004).
157. Bubb, 768 N.W.2d at 905.
158. Id. at 906.

159. Id.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 914.
Wis. STAT. § 448.30 (1981).
Bubb, 768 N.W.2d at 918.

INFORMED CONSENT

2014]

369

supreme court persisted in its broad interpretation of the statute,
commenting that the medical facts "demonstrate that a reasonable jury
could conclude that a reasonable person in [plaintiffs] condition would
have wanted to know about the alternative of admission with further
diagnostic testing."' 6 7 To this statement, I pose the following question:
how would the patient have the wherewithal to know if he should have
been admitted to the hospital? This exposes the fallacy of the supreme
court's position and the breadth of the statute. The patient should have
been admitted to the hospital for tests, and was not; if the ER physician
arrived at the improper diagnosis, these facts support a medical
negligence claim unrelated to the doctrine of informed consent.
In the end, the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved the jury's verdict
in favor of the ER physician on the medical negligence claim and noted
this defense-friendly verdict did not relieve the physician from statutory
liability for the failure to disclose. 6 8
Approximately three years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court again
had the occasion to revisit the law of informed consent.169 The aftermath
caused a profound and necessary change in Wisconsin law.
I. Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Compensation
Fund 70
In Jandre,the supreme court once again put its stamp of approval on
the law of informed consent as a law of full disclosure. 7' Here, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant physician on the medical
negligence claim but in favor of the patient on the informed consent
claim. 172
As with other post-statute cases, the Jandre facts focus on an alleged
misdiagnosis. The patient suffered drooling, slurred speech and onesided facial droop, dizziness, and leg weakness. 3 He was taken to the
emergency room and was evaluated by the defendant, yielding a
"differential diagnosis includ[ing] 'Bell's Palsy, stroke, TIA, all of those
stroke syndromes including ischemic as well as hemorrhagic, tumors,
syndromes like-things like Guillain-Barre, MS [multiple sclerosis], and

167.
168.
169.
2012).
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 923.
Id. at 925.
Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627 (Wis.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 640.
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multiple other things like that."'l 74 The defendant obtained tests to rule
out a stroke, but she did not order a carotid ultrasound, a non-invasive
procedure that could have been performed at the hospital.' 75 Ultimately,
the defendant diagnosed "a mild form of Bell's palsy."' 76 Defendant
advised the patient of the diagnosis and "prescribed medication[] and
sent him home with instructions to see a neurologist for follow-up
care." 1 77 The supreme court specifically noted various medical facts that
the defendant did not disclose to the patient, largely concerning the
differential diagnosis as including stroke.' 78
Three days later, "[plaintiff] saw a family medicine physician who
noted that [he] exhibited signs of resolving Bell's palsy." 7 A week or so
later, the plaintiff "suffered a full-blown stroke, which impaired his
physical and cognitive abilities." 80 A significant carotid artery blockage
was revealed by a carotid ultrasound, the test not ordered by the
defendant.' 8'
As in its other opinions addressing informed consent, the supreme
court reviewed its pre- and post-statutory jurisprudence and, of course,
the informed consent statute. It is important to analyze the following
comment by the supreme court: "Creating informed consent
requirements that allow physicians to confidently perform their allimportant work without fearing unfair and unpredictable liability, and
that give patients a meaningful opportunity to intelligently exercise their
right of self-determination, is the challenge."' 82 It would be difficult to
argue with this statement as a goal or theory of informed consent, but a
doctrine unrelated to a proposed treatment or procedure is neither
conventional nor comforting to physicians. One can question whether
true informed consent is ascertainable.
The supreme court also stated: "The court has observed that '[w]hat
constitutes informed consent in a given case emanates from what a
reasonable person in the patient's position would want to know."" 8 " This
comment is significant, as it refers to the adoption of the reasonable
174. Id.
175. Id. at 641.
176. Id. For pertinent medical literature regarding Bell's Palsy, see generally Jeffrey D.
Tiemstra & Nandini Khatkhate, Bell's Palsy: Diagnosis and Management, 76 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 997 (2007); Anwar Ahmed, When is Facial Paralysis Bell Palsy? Current
Diagnosis and Treatment, 72 CLEVELAND CLINIC J. MED. 398 (2005).
177. Jandre, 813 N.W.2d at 641.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 642.
182. Id. at 635-36.
183. Id. at 636 (quoting Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 502-03 (Wis. 1996)).

2014]

INFORMED CONSENT

371

patient standard to govern the patient's burden of proof in an informed
consent claim,184 as opposed to the physician-based standard or
professional model.' 8 5 The latter "requires expert testimony to establish
the content of a reasonable disclosure."' 86 The former does not.'87 But the
choice of standard, for proof purposes, is not the choice of disclosure
parameters. Either model can be applied to the determination of whether
a physician obtained informed consent limited to the proposed treatment
or procedure.
A further comment by the supreme court is: "The court has rejected a
proposed bright-line rule that would require physicians 'to disclose only
significant complications intrinsic to the contemplated procedure.' The
court has observed that '[t]he prudent patient standard adopted by
Wisconsin in Scaria is incompatible with such a bright line rule."" 8 8
Again, the supreme court has confused the breadth of the doctrine of
informed consent and the type of proof required to claim that the
necessary disclosures were not made. A physician may diagnose
condition "X" and recommend treatment "Y." The informed consent
model adopted by the jurisdiction will determine the type of proof
necessary (expert or non-expert), i.e., should the patient have been told
about certain risks, benefits, and alternatives to the treatment or therapy
proposed? The model does not suggest that the physician is obligated to
disclose his or her entire thought process, the differential diagnosis, the
discarded diagnoses, and whatever is medically possible to explore every
conceivable diagnosis. This point is discussed further later in this Article.
The result of Jandre was to confirm the supreme court's expansive
and impractical view of Wisconsin's law of informed consent. What
happened next was remarkable.
J. Wisconsin Medicine Strikes Back
The Jandre opinion was issued on April 17, 2012.189 On the same
day, a statement issued by the Wisconsin Medical Society, the Wisconsin
Chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians, and the
Wisconsin Hospital Association "expressed their disappointment that the
Court's decision today fails to clarify the scope of a physician's duty to
inform patients about treatment and diagnostic options the physician
184. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 4, at § 6-10(b).
185. Id. at § 6-10(a).
186. Id.
187. See id. at § 6-10(b).
188. Jandre, 813 N.W.2d at 636-37 (citing Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495,
504 (Wis. 1996)).
189. Jandre, 813 N.W.2d 627.
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does not recommend."o90 Among other comments, the statement
concluded that "WHA, WACEP and the Society will pursue legislation
in the next session to address this important issue."' 9 1
On May 25, 2012, The Valued Voice, a publication of the Wisconsin
Hospital Association, noted that various "health care organizations have
begun work on draft legislation to address . . . Jandre ... ."92 The report

focused on a concern with the proliferation of "defensive medicine."' 93
Furthermore, from July 2012 through April 2013, various news articles
addressed Jandre issues. 194
K. The New Informed Consent Statute
A detailed discussion of Wisconsin's political process pertaining to
proposed legislation is unnecessary here. It is sufficient, and significant,
to report that in December 2013, the governor signed into law Assembly
Bill 139, which substantially amended the Wisconsin law of informed
consent.' 95 The new statute' 9 6 provides as follows:

190. Press Release, Wis. Med. Soc'y, Statement by the Wisconsin Hospital
Association, the Wisconsin Medical Society and the Wisconsin Chapter of the American
College of Emergency Physicians Concerning the Supreme Court Decision on Jandre v
Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund (Apr. 17, 2012), available
https://www.wisconsinmedicalsociety.org/_WMS/caseat
summaries/jandre/Jandrestatement_04172012.pdf [hereinafter Statement].
191. Id.
192. WHA Hosts Jandre Work Group, THE VALUED VOICE (Wis. Hospital Ass'n,
at
available
1,
at
25,
2012,
May
WI),
Madison,
www.wha.org/pubarchive/valuedvoice/vv5-25-12.pdf.
193. Id.
194. Dan Shaw, Malpractice Stats Don't Support FearsAbout Wisconsin's InformedPM),
2013,
5:01
(Apr.
12,
LAW
JOURNAL
Wis.
Consent Law,
http://wislawjoumal.com/2013/04/12/malpractice-stats-dont-support-fears-aboutinformed-consent-law/; David Wahlberg, How Much Should Doctor Tell You?, Wis.
AM),
9:00
2012,
9,
(July
JOURNAL
STATE
http://host.madison.com/news/local/healthmed fit/health-sense/health-sense-how-muchshould-doctor-tell-you/article_43f5b7bc-c7ca- lIe I-92c6-00 1a4bcf887a.html; Mark Kass,
Health Care Guide: Take 5-Eric Borgerding, MILWAUKEE BUs. JOURNAL (Dec. 20,
2012, 6:00 AM); David Wahlberg, State Board Reprimands Doctor Who Was Found
Negligent by High Court, Wis. STATE JOURNAL (Mar. 21, 2013, 3:30 PM),
http://host.madison.com/news/local/health med fit/state-board-reprimands-doctor-whowas-found-negligent-by-high/article_68b00cc6-9266-l l e2-9d7b-00 Ia4bcf887a.html;
Guy Boulton, Patients' Right-to-Know at Heart of Wisconsin Debate, MILWAUKEE
(Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.jsonline.com/business/patientsJOURNAL SENTINEL
righttoknow-at-heart-of-wisconsin-debate-gu91f25-20503633 1.html.
Ass'N,
PSYCHIATRIC
Wis.
Legislation,
195. Recent
http://www.thewpa.org/?page=Recent legislation (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
196. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.30 (West 2013).
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Any physician who treats a patient shall inform the patient about
the availability of reasonable alternate medical modes of
treatment and about the benefits and risks of these treatments.
The reasonable physician standard is the standard for informing
a patient under this section. The reasonable physician standard
requires disclosure only of information that a reasonable
physician in the same or a similar medical specialty would know
and disclose under the circumstances. The physician's duty to
inform the patient under this section does not require disclosure
of:
(2) Detailed technical information that in all probability
a patient would not understand.
(3) Risks apparent or known to the patient.
(4) Extremely remote possibilities that might falsely or
detrimentally alarm the patient.
(5) Information in emergencies where failure to provide
treatment would be more harmful to the patient than
treatment.
(6) Information in cases where the patient is incapable of
consenting.
(7) Information about alternate medical modes of
treatment for any condition the physician has not
included in his or her diagnosis at the time the physician
informs the patient. 97
The statute is now entitled "informed consent," suggesting that "full
disclosure" is no longer the point of departure.' 9 8 The statute incorporates
the "professional model" of informed consent-the reasonable physician
standard, and, importantly, new subsection (7) links the required
disclosure to the actual diagnosis, not the differential diagnosis.
Presumably, then, new subsection (7) modifies the initial paragraph of
the new statute which, regrettably, continues to refer to "alternate
medical modes of treatment" without referring to the proposed
treatment. 199 At worst, the amended statute narrows the required
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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disclosure, focusing on the actual diagnosis; at best, it limits the
disclosure to the proposed treatment or therapy recommended for the
actual diagnosis. Additionally, the amended statute should assist in
protecting physicians from fending off informed consent claims when the
physician has allegedly made an error in diagnosis. In other words, a
physician found not negligent by a jury should not be liable for the
failure to obtain the patient's informed consent.
V. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON EXPERIENCE
The interesting and curious development of the law of informed
consent in the State of Washington may rival that of the law of
Wisconsin. An examination of Washington jurisprudence and its
informed consent statutes follows.
A. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Centerm
The law of informed consent, as it has developed in Washington,
may be as curious and unusual as in Wisconsin. In 1972, the Supreme
Court of Washington first focused on informed consent in ZeBarth v.
Swedish Hospital Medical Center.20' The supreme court, in ZeBarth,20 2
made clear that the doctrine of informed consent pertained to a proposed
course of treatment in the following pronouncements:
Informed consent, therefore, is the name for a general principle
of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of a
reasonable care, would disclose to his patient as to whatever
grave risks of injury may be incurred from a proposed course of
treatment so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own
welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed
treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, can, in
reaching a decision, intelligently exercise his judgment by
reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable
benefits.203

200. 499 P.2d I (Wash. 1972).
20 1. Id.
202. Id.; see also Edwin Rauzi, Infonned Consent in Washington: Expanded Scope of
Material Facts That the Physician Must Disclose to His Patient, 55 WASH. L. REV. 655,
659 (1980).
203. ZeBarth, 499 P.2d at 8.
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The duty of a medical doctor to inform his patient of the
risks of harm reasonably to be expected from a proposed course
of treatment does not place upon the physician a duty to
elucidate upon all of the possible risks, but only those of a
serious nature. 20

Thus, the information required of the doctor by the general rule
is that information which a reasonably prudent physician or
medical specialist of that medical community should or would
know to be essential to enable a patient of ordinary
understanding to intelligently decide whether to incur the risk by
accepting the proposed treatment or avoid that risk by foregoing
it.205

Thus, our holding can be stated in general terms: a physician's
duty to inform his patient is to inform his patient what a
reasonably prudent medical specialist would tell a person of
ordinary understanding of the serious risks and the possibility of
serious harm which may occur from a proposed course of
therapy so that the patient's choice will be an intelligent one,
based upon sufficient knowledge to enable him to balance the
possible risks against the probable benefits.2 06
These comments of the supreme court are significant. The law of
informed consent as announced in ZeBarth contemplated that a diagnosis
and recommended treatment would trigger the informed consent process.
B. Miller v. Kennedy 2 07
Miller concerned an informed consent claim arising from a kidney
biopsy that was recommended as a result of a hospitalization for heart
disease. 2 08 The plaintiff claimed that he was not advised that the

204. Id. at 9.
205. Id. at 10.
206. Id. at 11.
207. 522 P.2d 852 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), aff'd, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975), aff'd
after re-trial, 588 P.2d 734 (Wash. 1978).
208. Miller, 522 P.2d at 856.
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recommended procedure carried a risk of kidney loss. 2 09 In fact, due to a
complication, plaintiffs kidney was surgically removed.2 10
In considering the claim, the court of appeals commented that: "The
scope of the duty to disclose information concerning the treatment
proposed, other treatments and the risks of each course of action and of
no treatment at all is measured by the patient's need to know." 211
Therefore, the court acknowledged the treatment-focused nature of the
doctrine of informed consent. The court of appeals did appear to depart
from ZeBarth by approving the patient autonomy model of the doctrine
instead of the professional model.
On appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, the appellate decision
was affirmed.212 In a per curiam opinion, despite the apparent departure
from ZeBarth, the supreme court stated: "We can add nothing
constructive to the well considered opinion of that court and,
accordingly, approve and adopt the reasoning thereof."2 13
By this time, the law of informed consent in Washington seemed
without much controversy. It would not remain so.
C. Washington State Informed Consent Statutes
In 1976, the legislature enacted two statutes relating to informed
consent, which would be codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.050 and
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.060. The first statute provided as follows:
(1) The following shall be necessary elements of proof that
injury resulted from health care in a civil negligence case or
arbitration involving the issue of the alleged breach of the
duty to secure an informed consent by a patient or his
representatives against a health care provider:
(a) That the health care provider failed to inform the
patient of a material fact or facts relating to the
treatment;
(b) That the patient consented to the treatment without
being aware of or fully informed of such material fact or
facts;

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 860.
Miller, 530 P.2d at 334.
Id.
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(c) That a reasonably prudent patient under similar
circumstances would not have consented to the treatment
if informed of such material fact or facts;
(d) That the treatment in question proximately caused
injury to the patient.
(2) Under the provisions of this section a fact is defined as or
considered to be a material fact, if a reasonably prudent person in
the position of the patient or his representative would attach
significance to it deciding whether or not to submit the proposed
treatment.
(3) Material facts under the provisions of this section which must
be established by expert testimony shall be either:
(a) The nature and character of the treatment proposed
and administered;
(b) The anticipated results of the treatment proposed and
administered;
(c) The recognized
treatment; or

possible alternative

forms of

(d) The recognized serious possible risks, complications,
and anticipated benefits involved in the treatment
administered and in the recognized possible alternative
forms of treatment, including nontreatment.
(4) If a recognized health care emergency exists and the patient
is not legally competent to give an informed consent and/or a
person legally authorized to consent on behalf of the patient is
not readily available his consent to required treatment will be

implied.2 14
The statute embodies the doctrine of informed consent and is
treatment focused, meaning that the physician has reached a diagnosis
and has recommended treatment based on the diagnosis. This statute

214. 1976 Wash. Sess..Laws 218.
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does not require the disclosure of the differential diagnosis or treatments
available to explore the differential diagnosis.2 15
The second statute pertains to the use of a signed consent form to
provide evidence of informed consent and provides as follows:
If a patient while legally competent, or his representative if he is
not competent, signs a consent form which sets forth the
following, the signed consent form shall constitute prima facie
evidence that the patient gave his informed consent to the
treatment administered and the patient has the burden of
rebutting this by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) A description, in language the patient could reasonably be
expected to understand, of:
(a) The nature and character of the proposed treatment;
(b) The anticipated results of the proposed treatment;
(c) The recognized
treatment; and

possible alternative

forms of

(d) The recognized serious possible risks, complications,
and anticipated benefits involved in the treatment and in
the recognized possible alternative forms of treatment,
including nontreatment;
(2) Or as an alternative, a statement that the patient elects not to
be informed of the elements set forth in subsection (1) of this
section.
Failure to use a form shall not be admissible as evidence of
failure to obtain informed consent.2 16
Again, this statute focuses on proposed treatment and is consistent with
the informed consent statute.2 17

215. Id.
216. 1976 Wash. Sess. Laws 218-19.
217. 1976 Wash. Sess. Laws 218.
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D. Miller v. Kennedy (Again)2 18
After Washington adopted the aforementioned informed consent
statutes, the supreme court revisited Miller following its retrial and
defense verdict. 2 19 The opinion does not refer to either statute, likely due
to the fact that the claim arose and was initially tried before the
legislation. 2 20 The opinion does not specify the date of the second trial,
and the supreme court focused on the propriety of the jury instructions. 2 2 1
A footnote in the opinion contains the informed consent jury instruction
at issue.22 2 This jury instruction, approved by the supreme court,
specifically refers to "the proposed treatment, operation or procedure."223
The supreme court affirmed the judgment.224

E. Gates v. Jensen 22 5
In Gates, the supreme court expanded the doctrine of informed
consent and applied it to circumstances other than the treatment of a
diagnosed disease. The opinion does not refer to the informed consent
statute, 2 26 perhaps because the relevant medical facts pre-dated the
statute.
Gates concerned an informed consent claim based upon the failure to
diagnose glaucoma. The patient's visual complaints commenced in 1972
and included "difficulty in focusing, blurring, and gaps in her vision." 227
Ophthalmologic testing of eye pressure revealed the patient "was in the
borderline area for glaucoma." 228 Additional testing yielded results that
might have evidenced glaucoma, yet one rather significant test was not
performed. 2 29 The diagnosis was "difficulties with the contact lenses" 23 0
worn by the patient. The defendant physician did not advise the patient
that "he had found high pressure in both eyes which put her in a
borderline glaucoma area" 23 1 or "that her risk of glaucoma was increased
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

588 P.2d 734 (Wash. 1978).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 736 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 738.
595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979).
1976 Wash. Sess. Laws 218.
Gates, 595 P.2d at 921.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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considerably by this high pressure and her myopia."232 Further, the
defendant-physician did not disclose the existence of other available tests
to examine the eyes.233
The patient's symptoms continued. Regrettably, in 1974, the patient
was diagnosed with open angle glaucoma 23 4 and eventually became
"functionally blind."2 35
Despite the fact that the Gates facts are illustrative of a classic
"failure to diagnose" medical negligence claim, the supreme court
applied the doctrine of informed consent, focusing on the patient's "right
to know,, 2 36 "not confined to the choice of treatment once a disease is
present and has been conclusively diagnosed."237 In doing so, of course,
the doctrine of informed consent was converted to a doctrine of full
disclosure, the "duty of [which] arises . . . whenever the doctor becomes

aware of an abnormality which may indicate risk or danger." 2 3 8
As emphasized early in this Article, this approach to the law of
informed consent is neither reasonable nor practical. If a physician
incorrectly arrives at a diagnosis, violating the applicable standard of
care in the process, medical negligence has occurred. The physician
cannot be expected to disclose and discuss the differential diagnosis and
all treatment options (including risks of alternatives for treatment) for
each potential diagnosis because the patient simply has no ability to
understand the information and make a treatment choice. That is the
purpose of the differential diagnosis. The patient does not have the
capacity to receive copious amounts of medical information and certainly
has no basis on which to choose treatment. The patient relies on the
physician to arrive at the correct diagnosis and recommend appropriate
treatment.
F. Keogan v. Holy Family Hospital 239

Keogan is yet another example of a missed medical diagnosis having
been transformed into an informed consent claim under the law of
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. "Open angle glaucoma ... is a slowly progressive atrophy of the optic nerve,
characterised by loss of peripheral visual function and an excavated appearance of the
optic disc by ophthalmoscopy." Harry A. Quigley, Number of People with Glaucoma
Worldwide, 80 BRT. J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 389, 389 (1996).
235. Gates, 595 P.2d at 922.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 923.
239. 622 P.2d 1246 (Wash. 1980).
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Washington. Here, a patient experiencing chest pain was seen by his
family physician. 240 During the evaluation, an EKG was within the range
of normal. 2 4 1 The defendant-physician "suspected angina pectoris" 242 but
did not so inform the patient, did not perform tests to.diagnose angina,
and, in fact, "diagnosed [the patient's] condition as an inflammation of
sternum cartilage."243
On a subsequent visit with this physician, the patient reported "pain
and gastric problems after eating." 2 44 After referring to apparently
abnormal test results, the physician prescribed an antacid, not advising
245
the patient that he may have angina.
The patient's complaints continued, and ultimately he was taken to
the emergency room.246 The ER physician did not perform an EKG. 24 7
The ER physician consulted with the patient's family physician and the
patient would have been discharged but for the insistence of the patient
and his wife.248 He was admitted to the hospital, continued to deteriorate,
and was transferred to the coronary care unit, where he died.249
The lawsuit against the family physician, the ER physician, and the
hospital was tried to a jury, which rendered a defense verdict. 25 0 The
judgment was affirmed on appeal. 2 5 1 "Plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration was stayed pending [the supreme court's] decision in
Gates . . . ." The motion was then denied and the supreme court "granted
plaintiffs' petition for review of the trial court's refusal to give proposed
informed consent instructions and its refusal to find as a matter of law
that the defendants had deviated from the medical standard of care
applicable to the facts of this case." 2 52
Essentially, then, the supreme court's review focused on the
informed consent claim against the family physician and the negligence
claim against the ER physician. This context is significant because it
directly relates to the alignment of the supreme court justices' opinions.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
.249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1250.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
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The majority opinion, written by Justice Horowitz, speaks to the
negligence of the ER physician as a matter of law.253 However, one
justice published a concurrence in part and a dissent in part and was
joined in this opinion by four other justices, thereby constituting a
"majority" dissenting from the position that the family physician had the
duty to disclose information regarding his "non-diagnosis" of angina and
that the trial court should have given an informed consent instruction.254
The court of appeals' opinion was reversed and the case remanded for
additional proceedings.255
Following Keogan, a legitimate concern existed as to the status of
Washington's informed consent law. In 1980, a majority of the supreme
court did not believe that the law of informed consent required the
disclosure of the differential diagnosis. Speaking to this concern, the
"dissenting majority" in Keogan noted "[bly this opinion, this court
establishes, as a matter of law, a medical standard in this state that a
patient complaining to his doctor of chest pain must be given a short
course in medicine in heart disease and everything else that could cause
chest pain." 2 5 6 Precisely! This statement aptly criticizes the physician's
obligation to disclose the differential diagnosis. If the physician fails to
arrive at the proper diagnosis, the claim should be for medical
negligence, not the failure to obtain the patient's informed consent.
G. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.257
In Harbeson, the Washington Supreme Court considered questions
certified by the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington concerning claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life. 258
Here, an epileptic pregnant mother was prescribed Dilantin, an
anticonvulsant medication. 2 5 9 Apparently, neurologists advised the
patient that "Dilantin could cause cleft palate and temporary
hirsutism,"2 60 but did not "conduct[] literature searches or consult[] other
sources for specific information regarding the correlation between
Dilantin and birth defects."26' Ultimately, two of the patients' children,
born after pregnancies during which Dilantin was taken, suffered "fetal
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1260 (Hicks, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1261 (Hicks, J., dissenting).
656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
Id. at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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hydantoin syndrome." 262 The informed consent claim urged that had the
parents "been informed of the potential birth defects associated with the
use of Dilantin during pregnancy, they would not have had any other
children."263
The supreme court examined the history of the doctrine of informed
consent in Washington, referred to the statute 26 4 and to the ZeBarth265
opinion as controlling of the claim based on the time health care was
provided, and held that the doctrine required the disclosure of Dilantin's
link with birth defects. 2 66
In Harbeson, the supreme court focused on the anticonvulsant
medication prescribed by the patient's physicians. 267 Certainly, the
classic doctrine of informed consent applies well here. The patient had
the diagnosis of epilepsy.26 8 She became pregnant and was prescribed a
medication which carried the potential risk to the newborn of birth
defects. 2 69 The parents were entitled to know these risks. 2 70 Harbeson
represents a proper application of the law of informed consent to
treatment recommended following a diagnosis.
H. Bays v. St. Luke's Hospital 271
Bays involved medical negligence and informed consent claims
involving the eventual death of an employee injured at work. 272 The
injuries included a dislocated shoulder and spinal compression
fractures.273 While in the hospital, Mr. Bays was advised "to move his
legs to prevent blood clots from developing., 27 4 He was "prescribed
antiembolism stockings . .. to wear."275

262. Id.; see also Bruce A. Buehler et al., Prenatal Prediction of Risk of the Fetal
Hydantoin Syndrome, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1567, 1567 (1990) (referring to antiepileptic medications).
263. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 486.
264. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (1983).
265. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical Center, 499 P.2d I (Wash. 1972).
266. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 494.
267. Id. at 486.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 490.
271. 825 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
272. Id. at 320.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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While in the hospital, Mr. Bays developed severe knee pain, for
which he was evaluated and diagnosed with a sprained knee ligament. 276
Thereafter, Mr. Bays had an elevated temperature. 277 The defendantphysician was concerned about Mr. Bays' pulmonary function and
offered the following differential diagnoses: "pneumonia; atelectasis,
which results from lung collapse; blood absorption, which results from
bleeding around fractures; and thromboembolism." 2 78 A "chest X-ray
was negative for all of the four medical problems [the defendantphysician] had in mind." 2 79 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Bays died of a
pulmonary embolism.280
The trial court had directed a verdict for the defendants on the
informed consent claim.281 On review, the court of appeals first spoke of
informed consent in broad terms: "Informed consent focuses on the
patient's right to know about a bodily condition and to make decisions
about that condition. A physician has a duty to disclose an abnormality
which may indicate risk or danger in the patient's body." 28 2 The court of
appeals then referred to the informed consent statute28 3 and the plaintiffs
position, namely that the statute requires "physicians . . . to disclose

material facts relating to treatment of conditions which have not been
diagnosed by the physician." 2 84 An enlightened court of appeals
disagreed and quite clearly noted that "the duty to disclose does not arise
until the physician becomes aware of the condition by diagnosing it., 2 85
Bays, then, supports the proposition that the doctrine of informed consent
does not require the disclosure of the differential diagnosis.

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. "Blood clots called deep vein thrombi (DVT) often develop in the deep leg
veins. Pulmonary embolism (PE) occurs when clots break off from vein walls and travel
through the heart to the pulmonary arteries." Samuel Z. Goldhaber & Ruth B. Morrison,
PulmonaryEmbolism and Deep Vein Thrombosis, 106 CIRCULATION 1436, 1436 (2002).
See generally Paul D. Stein & Jerald W. Henry, Prevalence of Acute Pulmonary
Embolism Among Patients in a General Hospital and at Autopsy, 108 CHEST 978 (1995);
Jeffrey L. Carson et al., The Clinical Course of Pulmonary Embolism, 326 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1240 (1992); Joshua A. Beckman, Thrombolytic Therapyfor PulmonaryEmbolism,
311 JAMA 2385, 2385 (2014) (noting that "[p]ulmonary embolism (PE) accounts for
nearly 200,000 hospital discharges and contributes to nearly 30,000 deaths in the United
States each year").
281. Bays, 825 P.2d at 321.
282. Id.
283. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (1983).
284. Bays, 825 P.2d at 322.

285. Id.
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L Backlund v. University of Washington 28 6
Backlund involved the birth of a child suffering from jaundice
(hyperbilirubnema).287 The child's parents were advised of the diagnosis
and the prescribed phototherapy but were not advised of transfusion as a
possible therapy. 28 8 The trial court found that transfusion therapy
constituted possible alternative treatment of which the parents were not
aware and that the provision of phototherapy as opposed to transfusion
therapy was the proximate cause of injury. 2 89 "The trial court . . .
ultimately ruled in favor of the [defendant] finding the [plaintiffs] did not
carry their burden to establish . . . that 'a reasonably prudent patient

under similar circumstances would not have consented to the treatment if
informed of such material fact or facts."' 290 The trial court noted that the
jury returned a defense verdict on the negligence claim and suggested
that the informed consent claim must fail because phototherapy, not
transfusion, was recommended for the child. 2 9 1 The trial court's ruling
was affirmed on appeal.292
Although the supreme court affirmed and confirmed that a
misdiagnosis constitutes medical negligence, not a failure to obtain
informed consent,293 the supreme court made clear that "[nlegligence and
informed consent are alternative methods of imposing liability on a
health care practitioner" 294 and "[i]nformed consent allows a patient to
recover damages from a physician even though the medical diagnosis or
treatment was not negligent." 29 5 This holding is of concern and, frankly,
is an excellent topic for another article at another time. For purposes of
this Article, far more concerning is the supreme court's dicta in Backlund
that: "Whenever a physician becomes aware of a condition which
indicates risk to the patient's health, he has a duty to disclose it." 2 96 If
this dicta suggests that the physician is obligated to brainstorm with the
286. 975 P.2d 950 (Wash. 1999).
287. Id. at 952.
288. Id.; see Meredith L. Porter & Beth L. Dennis, Hyperbilirubinemiain the Term
Newborn, 65 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 599, 604 (2002) (noting the recommendation for
exchange transfusion for significant hyperbilirubinemia, otherwise noting the use of
phototherapy in less severe cases).
289. Backlund, 975 P.2d at 953-54.
290. Id. at 954 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050(1)(c) (1983)).
291. Backlund, 975 P.2d at 954.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 956.
294. Id. at 955.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 955 (emphasis added) (quoting Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 772 P.2d
1027, 1030 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989)).
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patient, the doctrine of informed consent becomes a full disclosure
doctrine as opposed to a treatment or procedure focused doctrine. There
is more to come on this point.
J. Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn 29 7
Stewart-Graves deserves a brief comment. It involves the emergency
situation exception to the Washington law of informed consent. 2 9 8 The
supreme court did, however, state "[u]nder the doctrine of informed
consent, a health care provider has a fiduciary duty to disclose relevant
facts about the patient's condition and the proposed course of treatment
so that the patient may exercise the right to make an informed health care
decision." 299 This statement appears to correctly connect the doctrine of
informed consent to proposed treatment, a proper application of the
doctrine.
K. Gomez v. Sauerwein 30 0
The journey through the Washington law of informed consent might
have ended with Gomez. Here, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of an informed consent claim. 3 0' The claim was based
on a diagnosis of a urinary tract infection when, in fact, the patient had a
fungal infection and ultimately died of fungal sepsis. 302
The court of appeals reviewed the history of the doctrine of informed
consent in Washington, commencing with ZeBarth.303 The court of
appeals then identified the appellate issue as follows: "[W]hether the trial
court correctly dismissed the estate's informed consent claim on the basis
that a health care provider's failure to diagnose, or its misdiagnosis,
presents a cause of action for medical negligence only, because no
informed consent requirement is triggered." 30 The court addressed the
expansive approach to informed consent advanced by the supreme court
297. 170 P.3d 1151 (Wash. 2007).
298. Id. at 1154; WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050(4) (1983).
299. Stewart-Graves, 170 P.3d at 1155.
300. 289 P.3d 755 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012), aff'd, 331 P.3d 19 (Wash. 2014).
301. Gomez, 289 P.3d at 756. The court of appeals also affirmed the jury's defense
verdict on the medical negligence claim. Id.
302. Id. at 757. For in-depth discussions of this disease process, see generally GuoHao Xie et al., Impact of Invasive Fungal Infection on Outcomes of Severe Sepsis: A
Multicenter Matched Cohort Study in Critically Ill Surgical Patients, 12 CRITICAL CARE
R5 (2008); David W. Warnock, Trends in the Epidemiology of Invasive Fungal
Infections, 48 JAPAN J. MED. MYCOLOGY 1 (2007).
303. Gomez, 289 P.3d at 759.
304. Id.
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in Gates305 and the interesting five justice majority-concurrence in
Keogan,306 previously discussed in this Article, which retreated from
Gates. The court of appeals concluded "that Gates has either been
abrogated or limited to its facts by Keogan."307 Alternatively, the court of
appeals suggested that Gates was sub silentio overruled by Backlund 30s
and by the supreme court's denial of review of other cases. 30 9 Therefore,
the Gomez court, forty years following ZeBarth, declared the doctrine of
informed consent returned to its rightful place in medical-legal
jurisprudence-applicable only after a diagnosis is made and treatment is
recommended.
On June 19, 2014, after a lengthy wait, 310 the Supreme Court of
Washington issued its opinion in Gomez,3 ' affirming the court of
appeals, holding that "there is no duty to inform the patient on treatment
options pertaining to a ruled out diagnosis., 312 The court noted that the
informed consent "statute clearly uses the word 'treatment,'
demonstrating the intent to limit informed consent claims to treatment
situations." The court refused to overrule Gates,314 but found the Gates
facts so unusual that the court predicted that "it is unlikely we will ever
see such a case again." 315 While it appeared hopeful that Washington
courts had received the guidance necessary to apply the doctrine of
informed consent as originally intended, the court of appeals readdressed the issue in Flyte v. Summit View Clinic.3 16
L. Flyte v. Summit View Clinic3 17
Regrettably, very recently, the Washington Court of Appeals, in
Flyte v. Summit View Clinic,3 18 added to the curious informed consent
jurisprudence of the state. Here, a surviving spouse sued a clinic

305. Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979).
306. Keogan v. Holy Family Hospital, 622 P.2d 1246 (Wash. 1980).
307. Gomez, 289 P.3d at 762.
308. Backlund v. University of Washington, 975 P.2d 950 (Wash. 1999).
309. Gomez, 289 P.3d at 762.
310. The Washington Supreme Court granted a petition for review on June 4, 2013.
Gomez v. Sauerwein, 302 P.3d 180 (Wash. 2013).
311. Gomez v. Sauerwein, 331 P.3d 19 (Wash. 2014).
312. Id. at 25.
313. Id. at 22.
314. Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979).
315. Gomez, 331 P.3d at 27.
316. 333 P.3d 566 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
317. Id.
318. Id.
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following the death of his wife and infant daughter. 31 9 His wife was
seven months pregnant and became ill with flu-like symptoms at a time
when "the Clinic had received public health alerts from various
authorities about a global pandemic of 'swine flu,' a potentially fatal
illness caused by the HIN influenza virus." 32 0 The recommended
treatment for pregnant women was the administration of Tamiflu. 32 1
Plaintiffs wife was neither informed "about the pandemic or the
available treatment." 322 Significantly, the treating physician at the clinic
did not diagnose plaintiffs wife with influenza.323 In fact, at trial, he
"testified that 'influenza wasn't something I had been concerned about
clinically [because] I'd ruled that out."' 324 His assessment was an "upper
respiratory infection."325
Regrettably, plaintiffs wife's condition worsened. Her daughter
"was delivered by caesarean section . .. after [plaintiffs wife] had been
placed in a medically induced coma." 3 2 6 She died about a month and a
half later.327 Her daughter died approximately six months thereafter.32 8
The surviving spouse sued the clinic for negligence and for "breach
of the duty of informed consent for failing to inform . . . about the

pandemic and the available treatment." 32 9 The jury found for the clinic on
both claims, and the trial court denied a motion for a new trial.330
The court of appeals focused on the trial court's informed consent
jury instruction: "A physician has no duty to disclose treatments for a
condition that may indicate a risk to the patient's health until the
physician diagnoses that condition."33' The court of appeals reviewed the
prior case law and statute, previously discussed in detail in this paper,
and stated that the "diagnosis" for the patient was in dispute, and
therefore the patient was entitled to information about the public health
issue and available treatment. 33 2 The court of appeals, in effect, held that
319. Id. at 568.
320. Id.
321. See Penelope Ward et al., Oseltamivir (Tamflu)
Event of an Influenza Pandemic, 55 J. ANTIMICROBIAL
(2005).
322. Flyte, 333 P.3d at 568.
323. Id. at 569.
324. Id. (alteration in original).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 568-69.
327. Id. at 569.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. (alteration in original).
332. Id. at 573-77.
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a conclusive diagnosis is not necessary to the informed consent analysis,
resurrecting the position that informed consent applies to the differential
diagnosis. The court of appeals reversed the jury verdict.3 33
Flyte may add more uncertainty to the status of the Washington law
of informed consent. Again, Flyte seems a classic case of an alleged
failure to diagnose and treat. The doctrine of informed consent is a poor
fit.
VI. ALASKA
Another example of the judicial misunderstanding of the doctrine of
informed consent is found in the opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court in
Marsingillv. O'Malley.334 Here, the defendant-physician spoke with the
patient by phone to discuss the patient's gastrointestinal pain and other
symptoms. 3 35 The physician advised the patient of his inability to
evaluate her via a telephone call and he advised her to go to the
emergency room (ER). The patient asked what would occur in the ER,
and upon receiving that information, she claimed she was feeling better
and opted not to go to the ER. 3 She was subsequently found
unconscious, taken to the hospital, underwent surgery for intestinal
blockage, and suffered shock, brain damage, and paralysis.338 Suit was
filed against the defendant-physician claiming that he failed to
communicate the seriousness of her disease during the telephone
conversation.3 39 It should be emphasized that the defendant was unable to
evaluate and diagnose the patient and had advised her to go to the ER.340
Alaska has an informed consent statute,3 4 1 which provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
A health care provider is liable for failure to obtain the informed
consent of a patient if the claimant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the provider has failed to
inform the patient of the common risks and reasonable
alternatives to the proposed treatment or procedure, and that but
333. Id. at 577. The reversal was also due to an error in instructing the jury about a
prior settlement. Id.
334. 128 P.3d 151 (Alaska 2006).
335. Id. at 153.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 153-54.
338. Id. at 154.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 153.
341. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.556(a) (West 2013).
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for that failure the claimant would not have consented to the
proposed treatment or procedure. 342
This statute quite clearly refers to a recommended treatment or
procedure, which would follow a diagnosis. Nevertheless, the supreme
court acknowledged the application of the doctrine of informed consent
to the patient's claim, 34 3 despite the fact that the defendant-physician was
never in a position to evaluate the patient and arrive at a diagnosis.
Marsingillhas been criticized in legal scholarship, 3 " which also noted an
unsuccessful effort by the Alaska State Medical Association to amend
the informed consent statute. 345
VII. WELL INFORMED COURTS

Happily, there are courts that are well informed about the doctrine of
informed consent and related matters, and the following comments
derive from them. At the outset, a physician's failure "to investigate an
otherwise unindicated disease is not malpractice." 346 The doctrine of
informed consent should not require the disclosure of the differential
diagnosis, 347 and the doctrine should require disclosures relating to
recommended treatment. 348 The doctrine does not contemplate the
disclosure of "the availability of diagnostic and treatment procedures [the
physician] has concluded are not medically indicated." 34 9 The failure to
obtain informed consent is simply not analogous to a failure to arrive at a
proper medical diagnosis and, in this author's estimation, the doctrine of
informed consent was never intended to apply to that latter medical
mishap.

342. Id.
343. Marsingill, at 157-6 1.
344. Douglas E. Hutchinson, Marsingill v. O'Malley: The Duty to Disclose Becomes
the Duty to Divine, 25 ALASKA L. REv. 241 (2008).

345. Id. at 261.
346. Curry v. Dr. Elena Vezza Physician, P.C., 963 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013).
347. Horwitz v. Yale New Haven Hosp., No. CV 910324326, 1996 WL 469727, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 1996).
348. Vandi v. Permanente Med. Grp., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992);
Cline v. Kresa-Reahl, 728 S.E.2d 87,93 (W. Va. 2012).
349. Hall v. Frankel, 190 P.3d 852, 865 (Colo. App. 2008).

2014]

INFORMED CONSENT

39 1

VIII. THE COMPLICATIONS OF AN OVERBROAD DOCTRINE OF INFORMED
CONSENT

Although the doctrine of informed consent is thought to foster
patient autonomy,3so an overbroad doctrine may compromise health care.
A single hypothetical will suffice. A patient is in the primary care
physician's office with a common complaint-headache, stomachache,
or backache. The physician takes a history and performs a physical
examination. The physician, through education, training, and experience,
arrives at a differential diagnosis. The informed consent law of the
jurisdiction requires disclosure of the differential diagnosis as well as all
available tests (and risks, and complications), to explore the differential
diagnosis, which may include a large number of diseases. On the
assumption that there is enough time in the day for the physician to
disclose this information, the requisite disclosure occurs and the patient
tells the physician to arrange for each available test.
At least one court has recognized the extensive medical costs
associated with such an expansive doctrine of informed consent.,,' It is
quite clear that the history and physical examination will narrow the
differential diagnosis and assist in avoiding, or at least lessening, "the
cost of valueless routine investigations."35 2 This logic dictates that the
inapplicability of the doctrine of informed consent to the differential
diagnosis should assist the health care system by reducing costs.
In addition to cost consequences, there are medical consequences
resulting from the expanded doctrine of informed consent. The
hypothetical patient, demanding a medical workup for the differential
diagnosis, is seeking "aggressive medical care." It has been noted that:
There is growing evidence that exposure to unnecessary
diagnostic tests and specialty referrals can lead to a variety of
harms. For example, patients living in regions with more
aggressive medical care tend to have worse health outcomes and
lower rates of patient satisfaction, findings which may be
explained by iatrogenic harms (e.g., injuries during testing, side

350. For a critical look at whether true informed consent is a realistic goal, see Katz,
Informed Consent-Must It Remain A Fairy Tale?, supra note 3.
351. Linquito v. Siegel, 850 A.2d 537, 544 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
352. Gerald Sandier, Costs of Unnecessary Tests, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 21, 24 (1979); see
also Steven R. Brown & Jaclyn Brown, Why Do Physicians Order Unnecessary
Preoperative Tests? A Qualitative Study, 43 FAM. MED. 338, 338 (2011).
353. M. Brooke Hemdon et al., Older Patients Perceptions of "Unnecessary" Tests
and Referrals, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1547, 1547 (2008).
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effects of marginally effective treatments, psychological harms
of labeling, medical errors).354
There is evidence to suggest that older patients "would want a diagnostic
test or specialty referral that their generalist thought was unnecessary."
An expansive view of the doctrine of informed consent would not
simply create a risk that the patient would demand unnecessary medical
testing. Physicians understanding the breadth of the law would be
inclined to order more (presumably unnecessary) diagnostic testing
through the practice of defensive medicine.356 "When physicians
recommend procedures or tests without revealing their defensive
motivation, defensive medicine represents a breach of professional trust,
a form of deception." 57
An additional complication of an expanded doctrine of informed
consent is the extension of an already existing problem-is the patient
able to understand and process the physician's disclosure pursuant to the
law of informed consent? This is an issue of "health literacy," a topic
much discussed in the medical literature. 358
Health literacy has been defined "as the capacity to acquire,
understand and use information in ways which promote and maintain
good health" 359 and as "the degree to which individuals have the capacity
to obtain, process, and understand basic health information and services
needed to make appropriate health decisions."3 60 Poor health literacy
results from various factors, including adult reading levels. 3 6 1 "[P]atients
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1551.
356. See Kenneth De Ville, Act First and Look Up the Law Afterward?: Medical
Malpracticeand the Ethics of Defensive Medicine, 19 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS
569, 570 (1998).
357. Id. On a related subject, "many physicians were explicitly trained not to consider
costs or came to equate overtesting or unnecessary treatment with being thorough."
Bridget M. Kuehn, Guidelines, Online TrainingAim to Teach Physicians to Weigh Costs
of Care,Become Better Stewards ofMedical Resources, 311 JAMA 2368, 2368 (2014).
358. See generally Don Nutbeam, Defining and MeasuringHealth Literacy: What Can
We Learnfrom Literacy Studies?, 54 INT'L J. PUB. HEALTH 303 (2009); Richard S. Safeer
& Jann Keenan, Health Literacy: The Gap Between Physicians and Patients, 72 AM.
FAM. PHYSICIAN 463 (2005); Ruth Parker, Health Literacy: A Challengefor American
Patients and Their Health Care Providers, 15 HEALTH PROMOTION INT'L 277 (2000);
Mark V. Williams et al., The Role of Health Literacy in Patient-Physician
Communication, 34 FAM. MED. 383 (2002).
359. Nutbeam, supra note 358, at 304.
360. Bonne Lorenzen et al., Using Principles of Health Literacy to Enhance the
Informed Consent Process, 88 AORN J. 23, 23 (2008) (quoting INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END CONFUSION 37 (2004)).
361. Parker, supra note 358, at 278.
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commonly complain that physicians do not explain their illness or
treatment options to them in terms they can understand." 3 62 It is not
difficult to imagine that "functionally illiterate adults are more likely to
have health problems, live in poverty, and have fewer years of
education.",6 Furthermore, poor health literacy disproportionately
affects the elderly "and inner-city minorities, the primary users of
Medicare and Medicaid." 3 " Furthermore, there are other factors that
might impact health literacy: pain, fright, and the use of medications.
Consequently, there are numerous reasons why patients do not have the
ability to understand health related information. Any effort to make the
informed consent process more efficient must confront the health literacy
issue. 36 An expanded doctrine of informed consent, a full disclosure
doctrine, compounds the health literacy problems by requiring a patient
to receive even more information that will be difficult, if not impossible,
to understand.
Last is the element of time. Does an office visit provide the time
necessary for the physician to undertake the disclosure requirements of
an expansive doctrine of informed consent? "Physicians understand that
the time spent with patients is a factor in patients' satisfaction and helps
to retain patients in their practice." 366 Although there is a concern that
'managed care has substantially reduced the length of patients' office
visits with physicians, ,,367 this concern is, apparently, unsupported by the
data.368 Nevertheless, office visits may not involve much time. It has
been observed that an office visit with a family physician may average
from thirteen to twenty minutes in length,369 certainly an insufficient
amount of time for the family physician to (1) disclose the differential
diagnosis and possible treatment options available for common
complaints, such as headache, back pain, stomach pain, or chest pain,
and (2) hope to obtain the patient's consent to treatment.

362. Williams et al., supra note 358, at 384.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. For an interesting and innovative discussion of a personalized, three stage model
of informed consent, see Gil Siegal et al., Personalized Disclosure by Information-onDemand: Attending to Patients' Needs in the Informed Consent Process, 40 J. L. MED. &
ETHics 359 (2012) (proposing that the patient determine the level of desired disclosure).
366. David Mechanic et al., Are Patients' Office Visits with Physicians Getting
Shorter?, 344 NEw ENG. J. MED. 198, 203 (2001).
367. Id. at 198.
368. Id. at 203.
369. Donna R. Rhoades et al., Speaking and InterruptionsDuringPrimary Care Office
Visits, 33 FAM. MED. 528, 531'(2001).
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IX. CONCLUSION
We live in an age of health care consumerism. 3 70 The doctrine of
informed consent, based on patient autonomy, is intended to shift from
the physician to the patient the control over medical decision-making by
allowing an "informed" patient to choose an appropriate treatment,
therapy, or procedure.
With Canterbury v. Spence37 ' as its popular point of departure, the
doctrine was intended to apply when a physician reached a diagnosis and
made a treatment recommendation. It was not intended as a full
disclosure doctrine, requiring a physician to disclose the differential
diagnosis, every test to explore the differential diagnosis, every treatment
available for each possible diagnosis, as well as all related possible
complications.37 2
This Article has examined three jurisdictions in which courts have
approached the law of informed consent in an unworkable, impractical
It is quite possible that this has occurred (and may occur
fashion.
again) because courts do not understand medicine and rarely, if ever,
look to the constraints of medicine when applying the law.
The law will not jettison the doctrine of informed consent. Truly
informed consent, however, is a lofty and perhaps unattainable goal. The
doctrine has its share of commentators and critics, 374 and the criticism is
well deserved. In their efforts to encourage patient autonomy, 375 courts
should not create additional impediments for physicians by expanding
the doctrine of informed consent beyond its intended purpose. Courts
doing so will endanger patient care through the resultant use of
unnecessary medical tests and procedures, and will encourage the filing
of more informed consent claims when the appropriate claim should be
based upon the failure to reach a correct diagnosis. Neither of these
outcomes are beneficial.

370. See Robert A. Berenson & Christine K. Cassel, Consumer-Driven Health Care
May Not Be What PatientsNeed-CaveatEmptor, 301 JAMA 321, 321 (2009).
371. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
372. See supra Part 111.
373. See supra Parts IV-VI.
374. See generally 0. O'Neill, Some Limits of Informed Consent, 29 J. MED. ETHICs 4
(2003); Oonagh Corrigan, Empty Ethics: The Problem with Informed Consent, 25 Soc.
HEALTH & ILLNESs 768 (2003); Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale?, Law's Vision,
supra note 3.
375. For a discussion on patient and physician autonomy, see Edmund D. Pellegrino,
Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the PhysicianPatientRelationship, 10 J.CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1994).

